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Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits
ersalience (Boston

Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-02, 2012).

Leigh Osofsky

As Lilian Faulhaber describes in her article, The Hidden Limits of the CharitableDeduction:An Introduction to
Hypersalience, salience recently has become a hot topic in tax scholarship. This increasing focus on salience
arises out of the behavioral economics school. No longer are taxpayers assumed to be rationally maximizing
their utility in the manner that economic models might predict. Rather, behavioral economics suggests that they
often rely on mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to make decisions. As a result, scholars have suggested and, to
some extent, documented how the salience, or prominence, of a tax provision may determine taxpayer
responsiveness to the provision. Scholars have identified two types of salience: market salience (the impact of
salience on market, or economic, activity) and political salience (the impact of salience on political outcomes).
Faulhaber's article addresses the scholarship regarding market salience. As Faulhaber describes, the primary
focus of such scholarship has been on whether and how low salience taxes (sometimes referred to as "hidden
taxes") may cause taxpayers to underestimate the true cost of taxation and thereby potentially reduce behavioral
distortions from taxation, which many view as the Holy Grail of tax policy.
However, Faulhaber astutely notes that this perspective regarding salience is only one side of the "hidden tax
coin." Faulhaber explains that low salience tax provisions only cause taxpayers to underestimate the true cost of
taxation when the tax provisions are revenue-raisingprovisions. Since scholars have not focused on revenuereducing tax provisions, they have not focused to any great extent on the phenomenon that Faulhaber introduces
in this article: hypersalience. Hypersalience, as Faulhaber defines it, is "the phenomenon by which the
prominence of a tax provision leads taxpayers to overestimate its incidence." Hypersalience exists when there is
a highly salient tax-reduction provision, combined with low salience restrictions or limitations on the taxreduction provision. Faulhaber's introduction of hypersalience into the tax literature is important for a number
of reasons. First, Faulhaber's discussion adds an important new dimension to the increasingly prominent
salience scholarship. Second, Faulhaber's focus on hypersalience allows her to delve into a number of resulting,
pressing policy issues, which have not previously been examined. Finally, Faulhaber's general discovery of
hypersalience illustrates a basic but fundamentally important lesson: Behavioral economics phenomena do not
operate in a vacuum. Rather, how they affect taxpayers depends on how they actually interact with particular
tax provisions and with the administration of such provisions.
Faulhaber focuses on one particular set of tax provisions, the charitable deduction and its limitations, in order to
examine hypersalience. Faulhaber describes the popular belief (often promoted by charitable organizations

themselves) that charitable contributions are fully tax-deductible. However, numerous tax provisions in fact
limit the deductibility of charitable contributions. In particular, charitable deductions are only available to
taxpayers who itemize their deductions, meaning that the vast majority of taxpayers cannot actually deduct
charitable contributions. Faulhaber calculates that approximately a quarter of all charitable contributions made
in 2008 were not actually deducted by taxpayers, and suggests that hypersalience played a role in at least some
of these contributions. She does so by examining in detail multiple factors including: the complexity that
taxpayers face when trying to determine whether or not they will be itemizing deductions, and the tax filing
incentives that likely decrease non-itemizing taxpayers' knowledge about the limitations on deductibility.
Faulhaber's examination of the charitable deduction allows her to delve into a number of broader policy issues
raised by hypersalience. First, as Faulhaber demonstrates, charitable organizations themselves greatly
contribute to the hypersalience of the charitable deduction, which potentially raises practical and normative
issues regarding the role of third parties in (mis)educating taxpayers. Second, policymakers' failure to
incorporate the concept of hypersalience into studies regarding price elasticity and treasury efficiency means
that policymakers may not be calculating these measures correctly. For example, with the charitable deduction,
if taxpayers charitably give in response to the deduction, even when they are not actually going to be able to
take the deduction, then the deduction may result in much greater giving per revenue cost than government
forecasts currently suggest. As Faulhaber indicates, this phenomenon could be an important, yet currently
nonexistent, argument in favor of tax expenditures enacted through the Internal Revenue Code, rather than
equivalent amounts of direct spending. Third, taxpayers influenced by hypersalience may overconsume goods
under the mistaken belief that their consumption of those goods costs them less than it really does. Perhaps
most notably and problematically, taxpayers may overinvest in home ownership as a result of the hypersalience
of the home mortgage interest deduction. Having identified these issues with hypersalience, Faulhaber
concludes that we should try to reduce hypersalience and suggests restricting third-party marketing as a means
of doing so. While both her conclusion and solution will not be the last word on the matter, they are a good
beginning in an ongoing conversation made possible by her unearthing of hypersalience.
At bottom, Faulhaber's article provides important contributions to both the specific salience scholarship and to
tax scholarship employing behavioral economics generally. Her article underscores a lesson any tax lawyer
would love: Understanding behavioral economics in tax means more than just understanding behavioral
economics; it also means deeply understanding tax law and its administration.
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